The Trump administration recently released its National Security Strategy (NSS), just as the U.S. Congress surfaced the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2026. While President Trump signed the latter—a trillion-dollar defense bill—into law several days ago, the two documents present radically different visions for America’s relationship with Russia, China, Europe, and its NATO allies.
To decipher these contradictions, Moambe.eu spoke with three distinguished Washington-based experts to put these shifts into context.
The Struggle for Executive vs. Legislative Control
The President’s strategy suggests the U.S. should only protect allies who “pay their fair share,” yet the new NDAA creates significant legislative hurdles for any presidential attempt to withdraw troops from Europe or South Korea.
Heather Conley, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), notes that while executive power has grown over the last 20 years, the NDAA seeks to restore balance. “The NDAA restricts the executive branch’s ability to implement its desired policies in certain areas, particularly Europe,” Conley says. She underlines that while both branches agree that allies must do more, they disagree on the method of enforcement.
Ambassador Michael Carpenter, a Senior Fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, who has served in both Republican and Democratic administrations, views troop deployment as a fundamental executive prerogative. He sees the NDAA’s restrictive provisions as “Congress’s way of expressing displeasure with the direction of the President’s NSS,” which sets the stage for significant troop reductions in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. However, Carpenter is clear: “At the end of the day, this remains the President’s decision.”
Ambassador Daniel Fried, a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council and former Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, adds that while Trump loves to assert authority even when his legal standing is questionable, “Republican support for NATO would make it difficult for the administration to force a total withdrawal.”
Ukraine: NATO Membership vs. Security Guarantees
A major rift exists regarding Ukraine. The NSS effectively closes the door on NATO membership, yet the NDAA continues to fund Ukraine’s military integration with the West.
Ambassador Carpenter, who served as a Senior Director for Europe in President Biden’s National Security Council, notes that while the current administration opposes membership, “U.S. policy could always change under a future administration.”
Conley, who served as President of German Marshal Fund in Washington DC points out that NATO’s “Open Door” policy is enshrined in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, not just U.S. policy. She highlights a growing conversation in both Washington and Europe regarding “Article 5-like security guarantees” as part of a peace plan. “What is the difference between NATO membership and similar security guarantees through closer military integration? Perhaps not much—particularly if the U.S. seeks Senate ratification for those guarantees.”
Ambassador Fried warns that leaving Ukraine in a “gray zone” of insecurity would be disastrous. “Russia would not stop at Ukraine; it would seek to impose such status on the Baltic States, Poland, and Finland, and would likely seek to annex Moldova.”
A Coherent Foreign Policy?
The White House aims to negotiate with Moscow to “stabilize” Europe, yet Congress just voted to increase military aid to the Baltics specifically to “counter Russia.” How can the U.S. maintain a coherent policy with such opposite signals?
Carpenter notes that while the current Congress is generally deferential to the President, “transatlanticist members are deeply concerned about strategic disengagement” and have used the NDAA to send symbolic signals of disapproval.
Conley argues that U.S. policy is in a “transition” between two systems. The NSS envisions a “modern restoration of spheres of influence,” while the NDAA represents the familiar 80-year-old policy of supporting territorial integrity. “It is less about coherence and more about a daily struggle between two visions of the future.”
Fried observes that mixed signals are not new, noting that the Trump administration itself is divided into factions over whether the U.S. should lead the transatlantic alliance.
The China Contradiction: De-risking vs. Dependency
Finally, the NSS calls for an end to trade and tech dependency on China, but U.S. defense manufacturing remains tethered to Chinese materials.
Ambassador Carpenter argues the NSS actually fails to prioritize competition with China, reflecting the President’s desire for a less confrontational policy than his advisors might prefer. He notes that the U.S. is “belatedly recognizing” its dependency on Chinese rare earth elements, making any rapid “de-coupling” nearly impossible.
Ambassador Fried agrees that the timeline for cutting ties is unrealistic. He points to the recent decision to allow the export of advanced NVIDIA chips to China as a sign that the administration may be less willing to “de-risk” than its rhetoric suggests.
Heather Conley concludes that removing Chinese content from the U.S. military-industrial base will be “expensive and time-consuming.” While the President seeks a “trade truce” with Xi Jinping ahead of upcoming summits, the decision to provide $11 billion in defensive capabilities to Taiwan may ultimately shatter that peace.
