Andrei Curăraru, a political & security analyst and co-founder of WatchDog.md, a think tank based in Moldova, was interviewed by Vazha Tavberidze of the Radio Free Europe Georgian bureau after the Parliamentary elections in Moldova secured a win for the pro-European coalition led by President Maia Sandu.
What was at stake in these elections – what would the alternative scenario have been if the outcome were different?
What was, and still is, at stake for Moldova is an open door towards the European Union – even with no objections from Hungary, unlike in Ukraine’s case – and, on the other hand, the expansionist vision of Russia, which regards Moldova as part of its zone of influence. For Moscow, Moldova is a key element in its future strategies to influence Ukraine – perhaps by deploying troops in Transnistria to divert some Ukrainian manpower away from the actual war zones, thereby weakening the front elsewhere.
For Moscow, Moldova is a key element in its future strategies to influence Ukraine
There are also the 1.5 million EU passport holders – EU citizens – who can influence political processes in Romania, our neighbouring country, and who could also be used to carry out malign operations elsewhere. Russia sees Moldova as part of its playground, one it has no intention of sharing.
Another layer of Russian influence is the church. Priests were actively delivering sermons ahead of the elections, telling people not to vote for pro-European parties because “they will close the churches.” In the week before the vote, 200,000 copies of a newspaper were seized; the message was the same – do not vote for the government, otherwise the churches will be shut down. This is a deeply painful issue for many, especially the elderly who go to church every Sunday and may well believe what they are told. And these priests are rewarded, sent on so-called pilgrimages to Serbia, Israel, Turkey, and given money for their sermons.
How decisive was this moment, and how irreversible might the result be? Your former foreign minister, Nicu Popescu, said that the fate of Moldova’s EU membership depended on these elections. Another minister called it the greatest breaking point in the country’s history, the most important elections since independence. Do you agree?
Yes. To put it bluntly, however slim Moldova’s chance may be, it has to be seized by this government while the window of opportunity is still open. We should be using the opportunity the EU is offering right now, because there are too many uncertainties to assume we can do it later. Look at the Balkans – their path has dragged on, and still there is no certainty.
What we feared most – and still do – is a repeat of the Georgian scenario in Moldova
What we feared most – and still do – is a repeat of the Georgian scenario in Moldova: pro-Russian forces taking power, making decisions that would force Brussels to freeze and eventually cut off relations with Moldova. For us, that would mean a huge hole in the budget. We rely on nearly €2 billion in EU financial aid, and losing that would plunge the country into recession. Poverty would deepen, vulnerability would grow, and we would be pushed towards Russia.
That is exactly the path they want: secure a loan from Moscow, on Moscow’s terms – creating a crisis that makes people more dependent on Russia, offering cheap gas or other discounts to keep us in line. That would shut the window towards Brussels for good. It would make us slaves to Russia, essentially.
Let’s look at Russia itself – how crucial was this for them, how much was at stake?
I think this was one of the last chances for Russia to take over Moldova through soft power. Because if Moldova continues on its European path, if new jobs are created thanks to EU money, if even the skeptics begin to see personal benefits, to see that life improves – then it becomes much harder to buy people off.
And a quick win in Moldova would have given Moscow a badly needed respite, both domestically and internationally: they could say, “Look, things are not that bad. We got Moldova. We’re working towards hitting Odesa from Moldova now, disrupting the logistics flowing from Moldova to Ukraine.”
If this really was Russia’s last chance to bring Moldova back into its fold through soft power – and it failed – should we now expect Moscow to resort to hard power?
That depends entirely on their progress in Ukraine. If they establish a logistical chain that makes it possible to attack Moldova – or to “liberate” Moldova, as they would put it – then yes, they would surely try. Our only geopolitical asset is that we don’t share a direct border with Russia. If we did, we’d already be in a situation similar to Belarus’ or Georgia’s occupied territories.
Our only geopolitical asset is that we don’t share a direct border with Russia.
But if the situation on the Ukrainian front remains unchanged – and it likely will – then Russia simply won’t have the logistics to support a military contingent in Moldova. On top of that, such a move would bring more sanctions, push the American administration to strengthen its support for Ukraine, and kill any remaining claim that Russia is even remotely interested in peace.
People often draw parallels with Czechoslovakia – it would be the second step in 1939, convincing even those who argue “let Putin have some parts of Ukraine, that’s all he wants,” that he will not stop.
President Zelensky said at the UN: “We have already lost Georgia to Europe, and Europe cannot afford to lose Moldova too.” What would a pro-Russian Moldova mean for Ukraine’s survival?
To start with what would certainly happen: it would mean limiting the logistical supplies coming through Moldova. It would create uncertainty for the Ukrainian refugees still here. There would be less diplomatic support – Moldova voting differently in the UN, in the Council of Europe, or other bodies.
A pro-Russian government in Moldova could give the green light for troop movements into Transnistria.
A pro-Russian government in Moldova could also give the green light for troop movements into Transnistria. There is plenty of military equipment already there – the problem is manpower. Sending in 10,000 troops and arming them would force Ukraine to redeploy forces to secure that part of the border, to guard against incursions from Transnistria.
Would that mean opening a second front?
Not necessarily. The frontline as it stands isn’t conducive to that, and the manpower and capabilities Russia currently has in Transnistria are far too limited. But creating pressure and a vulnerable point that forces Ukraine to tie down personnel – that is more viable. It would be similar to Belarus, where there has been no troop incursion into Ukraine, but the mere presence still ties down Ukrainian forces.
But there are missiles launched from Belarus into Ukraine. Could the same happen from Transnistria?
It could, but it would be more of a Mexican standoff. If Transnistria were to move against Ukraine, Kyiv could legitimately declare it Russian-occupied territory and strike it directly. Transnistria would not withstand that. So I would expect instead low-intensity diversions – drones launched from Transnistria, for example.
I don’t think a full-scale war is on the cards right now, given the logistics on other frontlines. But we’ve all seen the maps on the walls of Russia’s military headquarters, where Odesa and Kherson are drawn as occupied by Russia. And we remember when President Lukashenko presented maps that marked Transnistria as a target. The plan to create a land corridor to Transnistria has always been there – and controlling that corridor would effectively mean controlling Moldova.
But at present, the frontline situation doesn’t allow for that. And if things remain largely the same, I don’t think Russia will be able to amass the forces needed to take Odesa. Odesa is crucial for Ukraine, heavily defended, and it also serves as a shield for Moldova.
