Emmanuel Macron has described Russia as a predator at Europe’s door—an “ogre” that devours its neighbors to sustain itself and has no interest in peace. After years of engagement and accommodation, Europe has finally recognized Russia as a threat that must be contained. This requires Western allies to devise a new policy of containment, deciding not only how but also where Russia must be denied the ability to endanger Europe.
- Natalie Sabanadze is a Senior Research Fellow for the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House. She has served as the head of the Georgian mission to the EU since 2013.
- The full version of this article first appeared in GEOpolitics
As the old belief in transforming Russia through trade and political engagement wanes, a new approach is urgently needed to defend Europe and its neighborhood. There is a risk, however, that the long-overdue emphasis on security and defense will come at the expense of attention to democracy and human rights. This would be wrong.
Yes, Ukraine is the obvious priority. However, even if less obvious, saving Georgia’s democracy is no less essential. The Georgian case demonstrates that security and democracy are inseparable, also in a geopolitical sense. Saving Georgia’s democracy is the best way for Europe to push back against Russia’s regional interests and its disruptive global ambitions.
Saving Georgia’s democracy is the best way for Europe to push back against Russia’s regional interests and its disruptive global ambitions.
Georgia’s case is symptomatic of a fracturing global order, defined by intensifying competition among rival centers of power and the replacement of value-based multilateralism with transactional bilateralism. The ruling Georgian Dream party, which captured state institutions in Georgia, proved adept at exploiting these features to strengthen its hand and push back against popular resistance.
As this piece is being written, seven leading civil society organizations have had their bank accounts frozen, and a growing number of democracy activists and politicians languish in prison. The ruling Georgian Dream party is compensating for its crisis of legitimacy by putting opponents on trial, rewriting recent history, punishing dissent, and engaging in witch-hunts and character assassinations.
In part, the ongoing Georgian political crisis is the by-product of an incomplete process of democratization, carried out under arguably inadequate Western tutelage. This process failed to deliver resilient institutions capable of withstanding populist authoritarian challenges. But it created a sufficiently widespread popular demand for democratic governance to sustain civil resistance.
Yet, apart from internal tribulations, the Georgian crisis is both a symptom and a result of the ongoing unravelling of the rules-based international order under pressure from revisionist powers such as Russia.
Georgia’s modern rulers frequently insist that their overriding priority is the preservation of peace and stability amid mounting security threats and geopolitical volatility. Yet, it is far from clear how dismantling democratic institutions and consolidating power serve that purpose. Even if Russia applied pressure, Georgia’s rulers had options. They went far beyond the imperfect, but still Westwards-gravitating models like Serbia, or even Hungary. The Georgian Dream chose to go further, placing Georgia squarely in the anti-Western camp and using popular fear of war as a convenient cover and a propaganda instrument.
The changing international environment has enabled Georgia’s autocratic drift, exposing the limits of Western—especially European—leverage over neo-authoritarian regimes such as the Georgian Dream in the context of emerging multipolarity. Doubts over the expediency of supporting democracy mount in the West. With the loss of U.S. backing, civil society organizations face mounting pressure and, in many non-democracies, the prospect of disappearing altogether. For regimes like the Georgian Dream, this shift is a gift from heaven. It vindicates their disdain for civil society and insulates them from external pressure.
As the post-Cold War order unravels, the old certainties are disappearing with it. Established democracies no longer appear immune to the pressures of populist authoritarianism, while extreme polarization has become a national security challenge both east and west. There is no doubt that Russia benefits, just like it profits from and actively encourages the policies pursued by the Georgian Dream. And because these challenges – that of Europe and that of Georgia – have the same source and benefit the same forces, they could also be confronted together and in a similar way.
Placing too much emphasis on Moscow’s role not only absolves rulers of responsibility—a burden that is theirs to bear—it also misplaces the target of the struggle. Outsourcing agency to an external actor, however powerful and malign, makes it harder to defeat. It is both easier and more expedient to confront the Georgian Dream in order to contain Russia than the other way around.
It is both easier and more expedient to confront the Georgian Dream in order to contain Russia than the other way around.
The fight is ultimately for Georgians to win, yet it is becoming an increasingly lonely battle. It shouldn’t be. Europe should consider the strategies for defending democracy as part of the security agenda, which must be recalibrated to remain effective amid these harsher global realities.
Indeed, domestic actors resisting Russian-style authoritarianism must move beyond the post-Cold War paradigm and lower their expectations of external support. But Western actors, in turn, should make Georgia part of their Russia containment policy and revise their current “wait and see” stance; they can and must take advantage of domestic sources of resistance and resilience before they are damaged beyond repair.
Crusading for human rights may belong to a bygone era, but reducing threats on Europe’s doorstep remains urgent. Georgia’s slide into an anti-Western authoritarian state would be Russia’s gain, a tool to be weaponized in its future confrontations with Europe. Thus, preserving Georgia’s democracy should be recognized as a vital pillar of any credible Russia containment strategy.
