“The Black Sea will not return to the status quo ante 2014 until Russia no longer occupies Crimea, parts of the northern littoral and Ukrainian territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone, and considers the Sea of Azov a ‘Russian lake’,” — Matthew Boyse told toRadio Free Europe’s Georgian Service.
Boyse is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute’s Center on Europe and Eurasia and a former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central Europe; he recently testified before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on “The Future of U.S. Black Sea Strategy.”
In this interview with Radio Free Europe’s Vazha Tavberidze, he discusses Washington’s posture toward the Black Sea region, the strategic stakes for littoral states, and the implications for Georgia amid growing Russian influence.
Future of the Black Sea Region
Let’s start with the bigger picture – What does the future hold for the Black Sea region?
What we can say for certain is that the Black Sea will not return to the status quo ante 2014 until Russia no longer occupies Crimea, parts of the northern littoral and Ukrainian territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone, and considers the Sea of Azov a “Russian lake.” The eastern littoral will not return to the pre-2008 period, given that the Kremlin seized some 20% of sovereign Georgian territory and destroyed the Georgian navy — certainly not now with Moscow building a naval base at Ochamchire. The pre-2008 period was generally positive for the Black Sea itself and the littoral states. However, those days are long gone because it is impossible to imagine the Kremlin giving up these major gains.
It is impossible to imagine the Kremlin giving up its major gains since 2008.
This “new normal” comes with negative consequences for all the littoral states and actors outside the region. Since 2008, Russia has been an overtly disruptive factor — a troublemaker in what should or could be a booming, peaceful, stable economic region that connects the Middle Corridor, the Caucasus, Southeastern Europe, and the rest of Europe, Asia Minor, and beyond — if Moscow does not interfere all the time in everything. By its actions, Russia shows its imperialist, revanchist approach and clearly intends to dominate the Black Sea region. This puts a damper on what should be a major global crossroads and a region of stability, commerce, prosperity, and growth.
How much of a dent have Ukraine’s military successes against the Russian Black Sea fleet actually made on Russia’s ambition to dominate it? On one hand, we see that Russian vessels are forced to retreat further east and south — to Novorossiysk and Abkhazia — but on another, Russia now controls the majority of ports through which Ukraine once exported its grain to global markets.
Ukraine’s successes have been extraordinary, forcing the Black Sea Fleet to retreat from its ports on Crimea and remain essentially bottled up there, far away. This must be humiliating for the Black Sea Fleet and the Kremlin. However, the Black Sea Fleet still has major firepower, which it demonstrates regularly by using the Black Sea to launch missiles and other attacks against Ukraine before scurrying back into port. Crimea remains an unsinkable Russian aircraft carrier bristling with offensive weapons that can be deployed to intimidate or counter most activity on the Black Sea — should the Kremlin wish to do so.
The Black Sea should be demilitarized after the war ends.
For now, Moscow is distracted as it targets civilian targets in Ukraine with its Black Sea region assets. After hostilities end, however, the Kremlin is likely to want to re-establish its Black Sea Fleet and demonstrate to those who use the waters that they will have to contend with Moscow as the dominant player. That is yet another reason why the Black Sea should be demilitarized after the war ends.
Agendas of the Black Sea Littoral States
Let’s turn to the littoral states themselves. What do their individual agendas look like?
Their agendas are all complex. Let me list just a few, but existential elements of their agenda:
Ukraine: continue defending its sovereignty and independence, including by retaining as much of its northern littoral as possible to maintain access to the Black Sea and the world.
Moldova: continue the struggle to become part of Europe and the West despite massive Russian interference. Retain sovereignty and independence.
Romania: remain a bulwark of the transatlantic alliance, especially in Southeastern Europe. Develop its rich fossil fuel resources in the Black Sea.
Bulgaria: remain aligned with NATO, the European Union, and the West more broadly. Combat Russian malign influence. Develop the rich fossil fuel resources in the Black Sea.
Georgia: the population seeks to remain a sovereign and independent, pro-Western state, while Georgian Dream sees Georgia’s future as aligned with Moscow, Beijing, and others. Resist Russian domination.
And Türkiye perhaps deserves its own mention. How do you see Ankara’s role in all this?
Ankara can play a very positive role by ensuring that the Kremlin does not reinforce and resupply its Black Sea Fleet; after all, additional warships would have to traverse the Bosphorus, of which Türkiye is the steward via the Montreux Convention. There are too many Russian military assets in the Black Sea region already.
US Strategic Vision?
What does the United States’ current approach to the Black Sea look like — what’s the strategic vision, and what does it mean for the littoral states we’ve just discussed?
There is no United States Black Sea Strategy per se — for example, like the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, or individual “integrated country strategies.” Congress has been calling for the development of such a strategy for a number of years, but the national security bureaucracy has not produced a whole-of-government document with that title. That means that there is currently no unified United States Government approach to the entire Black Sea region.
There is no United States Black Sea Strategy per se
However, this region is so important that it demands a broader strategic approach. The Administration is currently drafting the big picture strategies — the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy — and hopefully they will contain references to critical regions like the Black Sea. We’ll see what is in them when they are released.
While we wait for these documents, what the US is doing in the Black Sea region provides indications of the current approach. The focus seems primarily on working even more closely with the three NATO members — Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye — on strengthening deterrence, improving domain awareness, and bolstering infrastructure, interoperability, and training through NATO.
The United States Government’s approach to Georgia is less ambitious, in part because the Kremlin has, for all practical purposes, “captured” the state via the pro-Moscow government. Georgian Dream is a difficult partner and is responsible for the downturn in ties with the United States and Europe, but the United States Government should not give up on the people and relegate them permanently to the despotism of the Russian world.
The Kremlin has, for all practical purposes, “captured” the Georgian state via the pro-Moscow government.
It has been painful to watch the vast damage Russia and Georgian Dream have done to Georgia, with its past positive track record and large pro-Western population. Georgian Dream and Moscow are responsible for the fact that many former close partners have been turning away from Tbilisi. I no longer represent the United States Government, but I know it still strongly supports the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Georgian people, despite their government.
While we’re still on the subject of Georgia, a quick follow-up: what are the potential implications of the Anaklia port being handed over to China by the Georgian Dream government, especially while Russia is upgrading its naval base in Ochamchire?
Very negative in both cases. China is not and should not be a Black Sea power, and it would become one under the Anaklia port scenario. Regarding Ochamchire, Russia does not need another naval base on the Black Sea. It is not difficult to imagine how the Kremlin will increase its malign influence along the eastern littoral if it has another one there.
How does the Black Sea region fit into the broader American “pivot to China”?
Both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy are likely to prioritize the threat from Communist China for obvious reasons; the Black Sea region will probably not figure prominently in them. However, the Black Sea does merit mention and attention, both given its geopolitical and geo-economic importance to the balance of power in Europe and Eurasia. That in itself is in the United States’ interest. The United States Government overlooks this region at its peril, given that it was the location of ten wars or conflicts in the post-Soviet period, and current trends are not positive. What happens in the Black Sea does not stay in the Black Sea.
EU Strategy
The European Union has also adopted its own Black Sea strategy recently. Will Washington work alongside Brussels as an equal partner, take the lead, or step back?
Yes, the EU finally adopted a Black Sea strategy in May, but it is not particularly robust. However, it is better to have a strategy than not to have one altogether. The Trump Administration should urge the Commission to prioritize the Black Sea region more because that is where the locus of instability and conflict in Europe has been for decades.
The Trump Administration should urge the European Commission to prioritize the Black Sea region more because that is where the locus of instability and conflict in Europe has been for decades.
The United States should also urge NATO to strengthen deterrence in the Black Sea region, as there have been far too many Russian probes of Romanian sovereignty, and too many Russian drone pieces have fallen on Romanian territory. This is totally unacceptable, and Romania should shoot them down. Bulgaria is also the target of daily Russian hybrid warfare; this must also stop, but Moscow is unlikely to do so. For its part, Türkiye demands a special approach given its unique relationship with the United States, the Commission, key European Union member states, and Moscow.
A free and open Black Sea is very much in the United States’ national interest, and the United States Government should work closely with allies and friends in the Black Sea region toward that goal. More European Union action on the Black Sea region is desirable because the United States Government cannot want Black Sea security more than the Europeans. While the Trump Admin has made it clear that America stands firmly with NATO and allies, it has also signaled that member states should not always look to Washington as the first port of call.
